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Economic Boom or Political Boondoggle?
Florida's Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal in the 1930s
by Michael David Tegeder

I

n the 1930s, the federal government began construction
on one of the grandest public works projects in Florida.
More than twice the length of the Suez and four times larger than the Panama Canal, the Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal was "perhaps the most opulent single symbol of the New Deal."' Yet,
despite the labor and massive expenditures on the part of state and
federal officials, the project ended within a year of its groundbreaking. Plagued by political controversy from start to finish, the
Ship Canal can be seen as a dress-rehearsal for the decadeslong
debate over the Cross-Florida Barge Canal that followed the
Depression-era project. Canal boosters asserted that, because the
canal would be part of a regional trade network, the project would
expand economic growth and guarantee prosperity for the nation
as well as the state. Amid the Depression, that promise seemed at
least partially fulfilled with the Ocala construction boom that
accompanied the dig. The canal prompted a wave of criticism,
however, as opponents tried to block future funding for the project. Nationally, anticanal forces saw the project as one of many
examples of New Deal profligacy and government waste. Locally,
the canal pitted region against region and interest against interest
over the conservation of one of the state's most precious natural
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resources-Florida's freshwater aquifer. The result was a contentious debate that, while ending the Ship Canal, entrenched
interests and produced a bureaucratic inertia that continually
pushed for a canal for much of the rest of the twentieth century.
For almost a hundred years, the Army Corps of Engineers
conducted nearly a dozen surveys to determine the efficacy of a
canal across Florida. Stemming from an effort to improve the
nation's rivers and waterways as an alternative to an increasingly
dominant railway industry, the Federal Rivers and Harbor Act of
1927 initiated the movement that finally resulted in the groundbreaking of that century-old dream.2
With this latest round of legislation came greater public interest and the call for another survey; one that would finally determine the canal's route. Completed by the early 1930s, the Corps's
comprehensive assessment considered twenty-eight possible canal
routes from one across southern Georgia to another traversing the
Florida peninsula at Lake Okeechobee and all points in between.
After determining that only seven were economically feasible, the
Corps asserted that among the choices, "Route 13-B" was most
desirable, practical, and economical. That path proposed to follow the St. Johns from its mouth to Palatka, and then along the
Ocklawaha River to a point near Silver Springs, and cut westward
across land below Ocala to Dunnellon and finally along the course
of the Withlacoochee River until it entered the Gulf of Mexico
near Yankeeto~n.~
The Corps recommended that a lock canal be
constructed along the route to avoid "seriously disturb[ing] the
natural ground-water table." Although engineers reached a consensus regarding the important issue of the canal's location, they
were not entirely convinced of the project's practicality, concluding that "the construction of neither a barge nor ship canal is economicallyjustified at this time."4
Boosters remained in a quandary: they now had the route but
lacked the wherewithal to pursue their dream. New lobbying
efforts centered on securing federal funds for the canal's construction. In 1932, proponents organized the National Gulf1.
2.
3.
4.

N m York Tintes, 24 November 1935, 10.
H. E. Barber, "The History of the Florida Cross-State Canal" (PhD diss.,
University of Georgia, 1969), 119.
Ibid., 120-24, 139; U.S. Congress, House, Atlantic-Gulfship Canal, 75th Cong.,
1st sess., H. Doc. 194 (5 April 1937), 2, 7.
Congress, House, Atlantic-GulfShip Canal, 2, 8.
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Atlantic Ship Canal Association, a regional effort to press their case
in Washington. Well organized and well funded, this group
proved crucial to convincing the government to build the canal.
Heading the lobbying effort was the Association's president,
native-Floridian General Charles P. Summerall, recently retired
Army Chief-of-Staff. The organization succeeded where others
had failed because it sought allies beyond Florida's boundaries,
presenting a strong, unified regional push to complete the canal.
Support from such other shipping concerns as the Mississippi
Valley Association, the Alabama State Docks Commission, and the
Atlantic Deeper Waterways Association negated claims that the
canal was simply a local bo~ndoggle.~
Amid all this national activity, the state of Florida, driven by
canal proponents' persistent demands, began to secure land for
the project and made plans to operate and maintain the canal
once it was completed. In 1931, the legislature established the
Florida State Canal Commission, a strictly voluntary non-profit
organization empowered to acquire lands for a canal. Most of the
Commission's support stemmed from city and county governments interested in the ~ a t e n v a y . ~Two years later, the
Commission was superceded by the Ship Canal Authority, authorized by the legislature to "acquire, own, construct, operate, and
maintain a ship canal across ~lorida."' Later the state formed a
special tax district--comprised of the six counties through which
the canal would pass-to issue bonds and impose taxes to purchase
rights-of-way. All of these measures created a local infrastructure
to build a canal; they also inspired long-term vested interests, at
once public and private, to perpetually lobby for the project's completi~n.~
With an established route and a variety of governmental and
private associations in place, local advocates concentrated on getting the canal built. Across the peninsula, from Yankeetown to
Jacksonville, both public and private civic leaders accelerated the
drumbeat for construction. On the west coast, longtime
Yankeetown mayor A.F. Knotts tirelessly crusaded for the venture,
5.
6.
7.
8.

Nelson M. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land: A Histoly of Water
Management in F%du (Tallahassee, Fla., 1980), 15 1-52.
Barber, "Historyof the Florida Cross-State Canal," 131-32.
Ibid., 135.
Luther J. Carter, The Florida Experience: Land and Water Policy in a Gmwth State
(Baltimore, Md., 1974), 271-72.
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giving speeches, and writing large numbers of newspaper articles
and letters favoring the canal. In Ocala, Evening Star editor R.N.
"Bert" Dosh contributed more pro-canal articles and editorials to
his paper than any other Florida newspaper. Indeed, Dosh's s u p
port for the enterprise was so unwavering that other boosters
memorialized his efforts by naming the proposed Ocala lock on
the later Cross-Florida Barge Canal after him. Jacksonville's promoters included retired Corps of Engineer officer Gilbert A.
Youngberg, who wrote numerous technical reports on the structural and economic viability of the project. Youngberg traversed
the state addressing local chambers of commerce and service clubs
on the importance of the canal to Florida's future. Yet, despite
their best efforts, these advocates and their allies made little
progress. In the end, national economic considerations, rather
than the merits of the canal itself, determined the project's development?
Ironically, the economic hardship of the Great Depression
became the major impetus for canal construction. With the stock
market crash of 1929, the United States entered the longest and
most severe period of economic dislocation in its history. With
hundreds of thousands of Americans unemployed by 1932, calls
for government assistance reached a fevered pitch. President
Herbert Hoover responded by establishing the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, a federal agency designed to combat unemployment. In August, General Summerall approached the RFC
with a request for $160 million in loans to build the canal and provide jobs for Florida's unemployed, but the tight-fisted Hoover
administration rejected the application. Months later, canal advocates put their hopes in a new president, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, whose willingness to support public works was unprecedented. Two months after Roosevelt's inauguration, Florida's legislature sent a message to Roosevelt "requesting the assistance and
cooperation of every available federal agency in order to make possible, at an early date, commencement of construction work on a
ship canal across the peninsula. .. as an effective measure in relieving unemployment and stimulating ind~stry."'~
9. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land, 151-52.
10. Joint Memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of
Florida, 27 May 1933, in Documentmy H k t q of the lhi& Gznal, ed. Henry
Holland Buckman, (Washington,D.C., 1936), 82-83.
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Bureaucratic wrangling and other political considerations within the federal government prevented the president from authorizing the project immediately. Caught between the technicalities of
legislative funding and the transfer of works projects from the RFC
to the Public Works Administration, the project's loan application,
now sponsored by Florida's Ship Canal Authority, languished
under the review of several federal agencies until an opportune
moment could guarantee its success. Hopes for a canal diminished,
however, as PWA engineers issued reports in early 1934 that were
increasingly at odds with the Corps's cost estimates. To make matters worse, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who also administered the purse strings of the PWA, had little enthusiasm for the
project, primarily because of the expense and potential environmental damage.'' Frustrated by the lack of administrative support,
nine senators from Gulf Coast states appealed directly to Roosevelt
in March 1934. Pointing to discrepancies between the engineers'
reports, they called for the creation of a special review board to
resolve the fate of the Florida canal.12
By June 1934, Roosevelt's newly appointed board of Army
and civilian engineers issued a report that, though supportive of
the project, arrived at a new set of conclusions concerning not
only the cost but the entire conceptualization of the canal. The
board took exception to earlier plans that focused almost entirely on the development of a lock canal. Instead, it called for a sealevel ship canal, which offered far more advantages, especially
with regard to its initial costs and ease of construction. In addition to cheaper operating and maintenance expenses, a sea-level
canal also offered greater ease and capacity for shipping. The
only possible disadvantage would be negligible damage to local
water wells along the right-of-way. Such a trade-off seemed
worthwhile, however, when the price of the project came in at a

11. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land., 153-54; Barber, "History of the
Florida Cross-State Canal," 143; Harold Ickes to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 26
August 1935, Office Files, Box 635, folder "Florida Ship Canal-1935,"
Franklin Roosevelt Presidential Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
12. Petition to the President by the Senators of All Gulf States for the
Appoinunent of a Board of Review, 2 March 1934, in Buckman, ed.,
Documentary History, 100-10 1.
13. Report of the President's Board of Review,June 28, 1934, in Buckrnan, ed.,
Documentary History, 10510.
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mere $142.7 million. l 3 Florida's canal boosters applauded the
recommendation, only to be frustrated once again as Roosevelt
delegated the final decision to Ickes, who strictly adhered to the
legislative provision that any project receiving PWA funds must
be self-liquidating. In other words, the canal's anticipated toll
revenues would have to offset the overall costs of construction,
maintenance, and operation. After years of delay, Ickes finally
rejected the Ship Canal Authority's loan application on January
29, 1935.14
Undaunted, canal advocates worked the halls of Congress,
seeking legislation that might secure funding from other federal
sources. As luck would have it, on April 8, 1935, Roosevelt signed
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which allocated federal
funds to combat unemployment directly under executive authority. Within the newly established Works Progress Administration,
Roosevelt now had the wide latitude to grant money to the Florida
Ship Canal Authority without Congressional approval. Moreover,
under the auspices of Harry Hopkins, who seemed like a spendthrift in comparison to Harold Ickes, the WPA was much more willing to embrace such large-scale public works projects. By June
1935, everything seemed to be falling into place for the construction of a cross-peninsula canal.15
For the most part, Roosevelt was receptive to the project. The
Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal was much in keeping with the New Deal's
effort to revolutionize the nation's infrastructure. Yet, a primary
motivation for such projects was the pressing need for low-cost
labor relief. As early asJanuary 1935, the president suggested that
he would allocate only as much money that could be spent in a
year, with the condition that 50 percent of the funds must go to
labor costs on a scale "somewhat below the local scale for common,
semi-skilled and skilled labor but above [the] home relief scale."
The WPA also had to employ people already on relief rolls.I6
Canal lobbyists like Florida Senators Duncan Fletcher and Park
Trammell, and Representatives Lex Green and Claude Pepper
emphasized the project's potential to ease unemployment.

14. Blake, Land into Water-Water into b n d , 154; Second Summary Report of
Administration of Public Works, January 29, 1935, in Buckrnan, ed.,
Documentary History, 12526.
15. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land, 153-54; Barber, "History of the
Florida Cross-State Canal," 150-53.
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Fletcher, in requesting an initial allotment of $25 million, persistently reminded Roosevelt that construction plans called for 25,000
workers for six years. The president was working with a more modest budget, however.'' With the unified support of Florida's
Congressional delegation, and presumably most of the citizenry of
the Sunshine State, Roosevelt finally allocated $5 million on
August 30 to begin the construction of the canal. Always the consummate politician, he took advantage of a natural disaster off the
coast of Florida to rally support for his decision. Following the
grounding of the cruise ship Dixie in a hurricane on September 2,
1935, he announced that the canal "would forever make it unnecessary for sea goers to risk their lives in the circumnavigation of
Florida's long, hurricane-blistered thumb."18
After a hundred years of countless surveys and bureaucratic
footdragging, work began immediately on a project of extraordinaly scale. When completed, the 195-mile passageway would dwarf
its closest rivals, the Panama and Suez Canals. Far from merely cutting a 90-mile path directly through the Central Florida Ridge, the
project also included significant alterations to the St. Johns,
Ocklawaha, and Withlacoochee Rivers. While initial designs recognized the need to preserve "the beauty of Silver Springs" as well
as the absorption of the heads of the Ocklawaha, Withlacoochee,
and Blue Springs, the project called for "much straighter cuts and
the elimination of the sinuosities in the present channel" of the St.
Johns River.lg Construction would similarly involve dredging a
channel-five hundred feet wide at the shore line and one thousand feet wide at its mouth-nearly twenty miles into the Gulf of
Mexico to make a navigable entrance for the cross-peninsula passage. Ancillary structures included four spillway dams and
between ten to twelve highway and railroad bridges with horizon16. Franklin Roosevelt memorandum for Secretary of War, 21 January 1935, Box
635, folder "Florida Ship Canal-1935," Roosevelt Papers.
17. Duncan Fletcher to Marvin H. McIntyre, Secretary to the President, 14
January 1935; Memorandum for the President, 25 August 1935, both in Box
635, folder "Florida Ship Canal - 1935,"Roosevelt Papers.
18. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land 15455; George E. Buker, Sun, Sand,
and Water:A History of thejackronvilk District U.S. Army C e s of Enginem, 18211975 (Fort Belvoir, Va., 1981), 165.
19. Tentative Program for the Construction of the Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal
Across Florida, War Department, Corps of Engineers, (Washington, D.C.)
1934, Box 635, folder "Florida Ship Canal-1935," Roosevelt Papers;
Congress, House, Atlantic-Gulfship Canal, 46.
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tal clearances of 300 to 500 feet and a minimum vertical clearance
of 135 feet.*O The undetermined number of bridges is notable;
plans were flexible and even included an additional canal cut
across the south Jacksonville peninsula.21
Restricted by financial considerations and a five-year completion schedule, engineers redesigned the canal at sea-level rather
than using locks as had been planned. This meant cutting a 30foot deep, 250-foot wide swath across Florida and its freshwater
aquifer. The project also entailed doubling the depths of more
than 105 miles of existent waterways. Along the St. Johns, for
example, the channel's bottom width would reach as far as 400
feet. Such a massive undertaking demanded the removal of nearly 571 million cubic yards of rock and earth, threequarters of
which would involve underwater dredging. The effort would be
worth it, however, as planners anticipated the Atlantic Gulf Ship
Canal to accommodate 94 percent of ocean-going commercial ves
sels from both sides of the peninsula. With a transit time of roughly twenty-five hours, ships would pass at least once an hour. Even
in its narrowest sections, the canal's width would enable two cargo
ships to pass with relative ease. When compared to the carrying
capacity of its predecessors, the proposed Ship Canal allowed for
twice the traffic and nearly twice the tonnage as the Suez and
Panama canals.22
Though boosters applauded the rapidity and decisiveness of
Roosevelt's support, they soon rued the relative lack of planning
and forethought in making the project a sea-level venture. Costcutting measures may have guaranteed success among
Washington's decision-makers, but in the long run such decisions
led to the project's downfall. Ironically, a more modest lock-barge
canal would have been more expensive but also would have been
For despite its proposed ecoless intrusive and less controver~ial.~~
nomic benefits, the audacious vision of the Ship Canal quickly gal-

20. Buckman, Documentary Histmy, v; Brehon Sumervell, "Atlantic-Gulf Ship
Canal," Military Engineer (May-June 1936), in Buckman, ed., Doczrmentrzy
History, 411-12; "Work o n Canal Across Florida to Start Immediately,"
Engineering Nms-Record, 12 September 1935,376.
21. William G. Grove, "Some of the Bridge Problems in Connection with the
Atlantic-Gulf Canal,"flwida Engim'ng Societ~Bulletin 1 1 (August 1936): 11.
22. Sumervill, "Atlantic-GulfShip Canal,"409-12; "Beginning the Florida Canal,"
Engineering News-Record, 2 April 1936,480.
23. Congress, House, Atlantic-GuZfShip Canat, 2,8.
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1935 Army Corps of Engineers plan for the Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal illustrating the
economic expectations for the completed canal. Courtesy of Department of Archives
and Special Collecticnas, Olin Librav, Rollins College, Wznter Park, fi.
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vanized a backlash opposed to the potential salt-water intrusion
into the state's water supply, threatening both the life and livelihood of all Floridians.
While critics began thinking through the implications of
Roosevelt's decision, the Army Corps of Engineers-even before
the official groundbreaking-was hard at work to complete the
project. Appointed as head of the project, Lieutenant Colonel
Brehon B. Somervell proved to be an eager taskmaster. An ambitious officer whose later career included building the Pentagon
and playing a key role in the Manhattan Project, Somervell arrived
in Ocala on September 6 and announced that he would employ
four shifts to work day and night.24 Acutely aware that a fait accompli was perhaps the best argument to secure more governmental
funding, Somervell proclaimed, "we are going to push the canal
right along as long as the money holds out. It's up to the other fellows to provide us with additional funds."25
Somervell and the Corps had to act fast, for the Ship Canal was
far more than a single public works project; it was an opportunity to
fiulfill a larger institutional imperative that saw the canal as only part,
though a crucial one, of a vast waterways project involving numerous
rivers and large expenditures of money. Rivers were not distinct
entities but potential networks for a wide-ranging inland waterway
system connecting the Mississippi River to the entire east coast.
When completed, the Florida Ship Canal would be part of what the
Corps consistently called "The Missing Link," the final connection
between the Midwest and the Atlantic coastline.26 Fueled by the
Corps's historic mission to facilitate internal improvements and
helped by a federal government committed to public works projects
to relieve unemployment, such large-scale water projects as the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Grand Coulee and Hoover Dams,
and the Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal were situated for success in the
1930s.'~ Indeed, given those conditions, it is striking that the
Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal was not completed, which underscores the
importance of both local and national politics to the project's fate.
24. Barber, "Historyof the Florida Cross-State Canal," 165.
25. Ocala Eveningstar, 5 September 1935, 3.
26. Address by Walter F. Coachman Jr. before the National Rivers and Harbors
Congress, 9 December 1931, in Buckrnan, ed., Documentary History, 25;
Sumervill, "Atlantic-GulfShip Canal,"41315.
27. David M. Kennedy, Freedmn From Feac The Amerdcan People in Depression and
War, 1929-1945 (New York, 1999), 146-49.
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In the shadow of an impending debate about the efficacy of
the canal, construction started at 6:00 am on September 6, 1935
as thirty men began building a camp to house engineers and
workers. Located about two miles south of Ocala on Highway
441, Camp Roosevelt consisted of "quarters for officers and barracks for enlisted men and laborers, complete with canteens,
mess-halls, and all the other appurtenances of an army post,
including guard-house."28 Initial plans called for an elaborate
complex that included a school, hospital, baseball diamond and
other recreational facilities, as well as community gardens.
Such amenities remained on the back burner, however, as the
Corps scrambled to establish a base of operations. Within three
weeks, the Corps had employed more than three thousand men
to build the main camp and portable bunkhouse sections that
were later established as six clearing camps along the canal
right-of-way. Within ten weeks much of the infrastructure was
in place, and the Corps turned its attention to the rest of the
project.29
In addition to commencing construction of Camp Roosevelt,
workers immediately began clearing underbrush along the canal
right-of-way seven miles south of the city. The official groundbreaking was held on September 19, as Franklin Roosevelt,
through a telegraph link at his Hyde Park estate, set off fifty
pounds of dynamite to inaugurate the project. With stores and
schools officially closed by noon, several thousand enthusiastic
supporters gathered at the sight of the blast to hear prominent
Floridians extol the virtues of the project. Among them was Ocala
newspaperman "Bert" Dosh, who saw the moment as the fulfillment of a dream to make his inland town a bustling port city from
which "a vast part of the water commerce of the world will move. .
. . Ocala will be at the connecting crossway of the inland water
courses of ~ r n e r i c a . " Senator
~~
Duncan Fletcher, credited with
securing the funds for the project, gave the principal address,
claiming the enterprise would "make the Gulf of Mexico the
Mediterranean of the western world. It will be an improvement for

28. Frank Parker Stockbridge and John Holliday Perry, So This is Florida
(Jacksonville,Fla., 1938). 191.
29. Sumervell, "Atlantic-Gulf Ship Canal," 413.
30. Ocala Slar Banner, 5 May 1996, 12; Barber, "History of the Florida CrossState
Canal," 169-70.
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all the country. It will bring prosperity to Fl~rida."~'While the
ceremony proved to be an auspicious start for the canal, those persons suspicious of omens had good reason to feel ill at ease.
Unable to keep an eye on the clock, the long-winded Fletcher
found his speech interrupted by a deafening blast as Roosevelt
precisely triggered an explosion at 1:00 pm. The disruption halted the ceremony as thousands began to scream and blow their car
horns, rushing to the site of the new ten-foot crater.32 In spite of
the blunder, boosters were confident that they were on their way
to building "one of the wonders of the world."33
Following the groundbreaking, work began in both clearing
the land and excavating the canal. Crews of 80 to 120 men
removed timber and underbrush by hand for eventual excavation.
While project managers established portable camps from Palatka
to Dunnellon, much of the work centered on nearly five thousand
acres of land between the Ocklawaha and the Withlacoochee.
Other workers followed land clearers, excavating the canal. Earth
removal, again, concentrated on the central section crossing the
Central Florida ~ i d g e . ~Given
'
the work-relief requirements of a
WPA project, the Corps's excavation procedures mixed modern
technology and old-fashioned muscle: "Working alongside the
modern, powerful excavating machines were men loading trucks
with shovels and mule teams dragging old-fashioned scrapers.
Huge tractor-scrapers, draglines, belt conveyers, tractor-hauled
wagons, and trucks all played a major role in the excavation
process, but always there were scores of men chopping and digging
with shovels and trimming the slopes of the canal by hand."35 The
use of relief workers came at a cost, however, as significant
turnover resulted from "many of the relief laborers . . . lacking in
physical stamina."36 Despite the preference for men over
machines, the Corps made considerable progress by mid-1936,
excavating nearly ten miles of land across the Central Florida
Ridge with no cuts into the underlying lime~tone.~'

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Tampa Morning Tribune, 20 September 1935, 1.
Ibid; Ocah Star Banner, 5 May 1996, 12.
Tampa Morning Tribune, 20 September 1935,6.
Barber, "History of the Florida Cross-State Canal," 168.
lbid., 171; Enginehag Neuc~Recmd,2 April 1936, 479.
Engineering NecusRecord, 2 April 1936,483.
Barber, "Historyof the Florida CrotwState Canal," 170-72.
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Canal construction, of course, brought a sudden burst of prosperity to Ocala as "money [was] easier to get and business generally [was] better."38 Recruited from Florida's relief roles, more
than six thousand men-far fewer than the twenty thousand the
Corps had envisioned for completion of the project-had been
put to work by mid-1936. By Depression standards, pay was good,
with workers making thirty cents an hour. Laboring only six days
a week in six-hour shifts, the men cleared $10.80 weekly. With
deductions for camp meals at fifty cents a day, workers brought
home $7.80, enough to live on and spend freely in Ocala's burgeoning entertainment district.39 New restaurants, hotels, and theaten opened as business increased between 25 to 50 percent.
Native Ocalans recognized the economic importance of the project and conveniently looked the other way as bars and slot
machines proliferated in their community. In one county meeting, ten applications for liquor licenses appeared on the agenda.*
While Ocala boomed, however, officials of other Florida cities p u b
licly complained that the ship canal drained labor from their
municipalities. Within the county itself, farmers and employers
complained about hired labor, especially African Americans, being
siphoned off by the project's lure of higher wages and shorter
hours. One crate mill, for example, had to close operations
because of the sudden labor shortage." Despite this and other
problems, Ocala gladly accepted the workers and the economic
boost they provided.
With the advent of construction, the Ocala area soon filled
with more than nine thousand new residents, including "itinerant
peddlers, preachers, medicine men, sooth-sayers, beggars, acrobats, and musicians" who crowded into "large and small side shows
and tent meetings" in efforts to cash in on the project.42 In spite
of the carnival atmosphere of Ocala and Camp Roosevelt, few
major disturbances occurred. Vagrancy became a considerable
-

38. N m York Times,24November 1935, 10.
39. Barber, "Historyof the Florida CrossState Canal," 171.
40. Kenneth Van der Hulse, "A Report on Conditions in Marion County
Resulting from the Gulf-Atlantic Ship Canal Project," 3, Box 30, Florida Ship
Canal Papers, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida,
Gainesville; Benjamin F. Rogers, "The Florida Ship Canal Project," Mda
Historical Quarterly 36 Uuly 1959): 15-16.
41. Van der Hulse, "Report on Conditions in Marion County,"4.
42. Ibid., 1, 4.
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problem as transients, arriving with little or no money, put pressure on local relief rolls. Anticipating only seventy-five cases per
month, the Salvation Army reported it actually provided lodging
for an average of 416 cases per month. Fighting, public drunkenness, and petty larceny were commonplace enough that the
Marion County sheriffs office tripled its workload since canal construction started.
Local city and county law enforcement officials expanded
forces, and the Army Corps of Engineers hired four officers, d e p
utized by the county, to maintain order in the camp. In addition
to guarding against illegal gambling, which proved difficult to prevent, camp patrols kept an eye out for confidence men on the
prowl for easy marks among the workers. With so many laborers,
prostitution became a perennial problem. "Questionablewomen"
routinely drove to temporary camps looking for "prospects for
their trade." African American prostitutes often lingered in nearby woods without fear of arrest "so long as they do not bring any
liquor with them." While not legally sanctioned, prostitution was
tacitly approved as community officials encouraged a local doctor
to combat venereal disease at an established "disorderly house."43
While local officials and camp administrators overlooked
minor legal transgressions, they could not ignore signs of what
they considered a far greater source of disorder: union organization. Officials thought that since workers were well compensated
for their labor, especially in the Depression-era South, labor advocates were troublesome intruders. Union organizers raised the
specter of strikes and other labor unrest that jeopardized timely
completion of the project. In March 1936, thirty-year-old St.
Augustine bricklayer George Timmerman was found "nailed to a
cross, in a heavily wooded section near [Camp Roosevelt] . . . his
lips were sewn shut and a heavy hunting coat was tied over his head
to muffle his groans. . . . Officers said he had been engaged in
Instead of investigatlabor difficulties on the cross-state
ing the incident, local law enforcement officials blamed
Timmerrnan himself, claiming that he had staged the fake crucifixion to gain publicity for an ostensible sideshow career.45 Ocala
Police Chief J.H. Spencer further accused Timmerman of "allow43. Ibld., 5, 12.
44. New York Times, 19 March 1936, 3.
45.

7 h Ocala Banner, 20 March 1936, 1.
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ing himself to be nailed to the cross for communistic reason^."^
After taking the man to the hospital for medical attention, officers
forced him to immediately leave the area. Workers were now
warned: labor organization would not be tolerated along the canal.
The threat of unionization represented only a minor irritant,
however, as increasing statewide and national opposition provided
a much more significant impediment to the canal's future.
Locally, a loose coalition of railroad executives, citrus growers, central and south Florida shipping interests, and numerous municipalities raised a chorus of concern over the canal's long-term
impact. Their efforts resembled a nascent environmental movement. While some of the anti-canal forces, particularly the railroads, clearly pursued self-interest, the opposition's objections to
some degree presaged questions later raised with the construction
of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal in the 1960s. During the
Depression, conflict over the canal was less a struggle of preserving
Florida's environment than conserving a precious natural
resource: fresh water. Without it, the Sunshine State's preeminent
industries-agriculture and tourism-would eventually come to
ruin.
Criticism of the Ship Canal began long before its groundbreaking as a group of railway executives, in a Jacksonville hearing
before the Army's special board of engineers in February 1933,leveled charges that a proposed canal would destroy the Florida
aquifer." Canal excavation, they asserted, "may have a very decided effect on the underground flow in the Ocala limestone, and on
the wells and water supply remote from the canal, and on the
Silver Springs Run, as well as many of the streams that come to the
surface" in central ~ l o r i d a .This
~ ~ assertion gained further credence with the release of a U.S. Geological Survey report in late
August 1935. According to Harry Slattery, Personal Assistant to the
Secretary of the Interior, the deep cut of the Ship Canal, "unless it
could be effectively sealed throughout many miles of its course, a
procedure presenting difficulties that appear to be practically
insurmountable," would "inevitably drain enormous quantities of
46. New York Times,19 March 1936, 3.
47. Barber, "History of the Florida Cross-State Canal," 159-62; Report of
Proceedings of Hearings Held in Jacksonville,Florida by the Special Board of
Army Engineers, 10 February 1933, in Buckman, ed., Documentaly History, 7080.
48. Ibid., 74.

Published by STARS, 2004

15

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 83 [2004], No. 1, Art. 5

water from the limestone" and thus significantly lower the area's
water table. More important, the sudden loss of fresh water would
allow salt water to rise and seep into the limestone, eventually contaminating the remaining deposits of fresh water, consequently
corrupting underground water supplies along the immediate
route and across "a wide zone extending outward from the
By the end of summer 1935, as boosters from such north
Florida cities as Jacksonville, Palatka, and Ocala seemed to be
securing Roosevelt's support for the canal, opposition from the
central and southern parts of the state began an organized camBattle lines hardened as
paign to halt proposed constru~tion.~~
the issue pitted Floridians against each other. The Hillsborough
Board of County Commissioners best summarized the opposition's
argument: "Incited by selfish interests and from a purely mercenary motive, an effort is now being made, through the construction of a cross-state canal, to mar and at least in part to destroy" the
region's "beauty, fertility, and health."51 Growers saw the project
as a direct threat to their livelihood. The editor of the Flom'da
Grower declared in June 1935, "in its pollution of our fresh waters,
it would be a greater calamity than any freeze or hurricane which
has come to this State." Indeed, the opposition portrayed the Ship
Canal as evil incarnate. For if Mephistopheles himself "wanted to
make Florida a part of the kingdom of the devil and to visit some
cruel and lasting punishment upon its people," he would build a
"big ditch" and poison the waters to leave rotting "oranges and carcasses on the parched sands of an empire once abundant in plant
and animal life."52 Fearing lost water supplies as well as tourism
and trade, Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Miami joined the protest.53
The Army Corps of Engineers soon countered critics with the
appointment of a special board of geologists and engineers to
49. Communication from Harry Slatte~y,Personal Assistant to the Secretary of
the Interior, to Representative J. Hardin Peterson, in Buckrnan, ed.,
Documentary Hbto7y, 154.
50. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land, 155-57.
51. Resolution by the Board of County Commissioners, Hillsborough County, 24
June 1935, in Buckrnan, ed., Dawnrnatary Histmy, 149.
52. Address by Marvin H. Walker, editor of the I;lorida Grower, The Stygian Canal,
at Winter Haven, 12 June 1935, in Buckman, ed., Documatary H i r t q , 144,
148.
53. New Ymk Times, 20 October 1935, IO(e); Blake, Land into Wak-Waim into
Land, 156; Barber, "Histoly of the Florida Crossstate Canal," 162-64.
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further study the issue of Florida's water supply. In December
1935, geologists issued a preliminary report arguing the project's
potential damage was negligible. Of the 195 miles of canal, only
27 miles of the cut-roughly 14 percent of the project-would
have any "appreciable effect on the level of the ground-water
table" and this would affect only the local area. While shallow
wells had to be deepened along the right-of-way between Ocala
and Dunnellon, the report claimed local agriculture and area
vegetation would not be injured. With regard to the concerns of
local officials in Tampa, St. Petersburg, Orlando, Sanford, Palm
Beach, and Miami, the canal would have no impact on their
water supplies whatsoever. Finally, while salt-water encroachment would take place at both ends of the peninsula, it would not
pose a direct threat to the underground reservoir of the Florida
aquifer.54
The assurances and authoritative tone of the report did little,
however, to assuage growing concerns of canal critics. With construction well underway by late 1935, the opposition became so
strident that many citizens increasingly feared that the Ship
Canal's completion would cut the peninsula in half and reduce
southern Florida "to the status of an island."55 Taking issue with
the Corps's report, one geologist complained to Harold Ickes that,
in addition to the prohibitive costs, the federal government should
not experiment with the state's water table. Drawing a comparison
with another New Deal program, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
he remarked that "if killing pigs or plowing up every third row of
cotton proves detrimental, the mistake can be corrected the next
year." Damage caused by the Ship Canal, though, would be "irrevocable and there is no way in which atonement can be made."56
One observer remarked how the tension between canal supporters
in the north and critics from the more populous south was "splitting the people of the state wide open." Likening the project to
"pure dynamite from a dozen angles," it became "the hottest brick
-

54. "Report of the Special Board of Geologists and Engineers Appointed by the
District Engineer of Ocala, Florida," December 18, 1935, in Buckman, ed.,
Documentary History, 159-60; N m York T i m , 27 December 1935,6.
55. "Report of Proceedings of Hearings Held in Jacksonville, Florida by the
Special Board of Army Engineers," 10 February 1933, in Buckrnan, ed.,
Documentary History, 72.
56. L.H.H. Calhoun to Harold Ickes, 1'7 September 1935, Box 635, folder
"Florida Ship Canal-1935," Roosevelt Papers.
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anyone ever picked up and if we don't have a civil war in Florida
with secession of the Florida peninsula there'll be a trick in it."57
Sensing growing resistance from across the state, as well as in
the halls of Congress, Roosevelt cautiously backed away from the
project by year's end. As initial funding rapidly dwindled within
months of the groundbreaking, Duncan Fletcher pressed the president for an additional outlay of $20 million to expedite construct i ~ n While
. ~ ~ Roosevelt had assured more funding would soon be
available, by mid-December he stipulated that further support for
such a major public works project-unlike the original grant that
came directly from the executive branch's general relief fundwould have to come from "some kind of Congressional sanction."5g
According to Ickes, who staunchly opposed the project,
Roosevelt's decision was less a matter of deference than serious
doubts "about the practicability of the canal." Unwilling to waste
political capital over an increasingly controversial issue, the president withdrew his leadership on the project and opted to "let
Congress handle the whole thing."60 The administration did
request more funding for the next fiscal year in the War
Department's appropriations for rivers and harbors projects.
However, canal boosters had to secure future support from an
increasingly skeptical legi~lature.~~
As Floridians remained profoundly divided over the supposed
threat to the Sunshine State's water supply, opposition on the
national level centered on the canal as a stunning example of
pork-barrel politics. Led by Republican Senator Arthur
Vandenberg of Michigan, canal critics viewed the project as "utterly without economic justification" and, perhaps more irritating,
~ ~ latter point was hardly
"built solely by Executive ~ e c r e e . "The
rhetorical, for Vandenberg saw the canal as a constitutional issue
concerning the "very process of orderly government." To him,
Roosevelt's initial support under the Emergency Relief
57. Dudley V. Haddock to unknown, 21 September 1935, Box 635, folder "Florida
Ship Canal-1935," Roosevelt Papers.
58. New YDljl Times, 25 October 1935, 44, and 8 December 1935, 43; Barber,
"History of the Florida CrossState Canal," 183-84.
59. New York Times, 18 December 1935,25.
60. Harold L. Ickes, The First Thowand Days, 1933-1936, vol. 1 , The Secret Diary of
Harold L. Zckes (New York, 1953), 488-89.
61. Barber, "History of the Florida CrossState Canal," 184-85.
62. Arthur Vandenberg to Richard H. Mahard, 28 January 1936, Box 2, Arthur
Vandenberg Papers, Bentley Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
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Appropriation Act was a dangerous precedent, not only bypassing
Congressional authority, but in so doing committing the "treasury
to vast long-time public works" that would transfer "the control of
~~
what
the purse from the Capitol to the White ~ o u s e . "Moreover,
began as a $5 million appropriation was only the first installment
of what would become a massive drain on the federal coffers.
While the canal's estimated cost was roughly $146 million,
Vandenberg claimed it could increase to well over $200 million
before completion.64
The canal debate shifted toward Washington when, in early
January 1936, Vandenberg introduced a resolution calling for a
full investigation of the project.65 The result was more than a partisan attack on what seemed to be another example of government
waste and New Deal profligacy. Through a series of subcommittee
hearings, Vandenberg raised doubts about the canal, questioning
the legitimacy of the project's authorization as well as the safety of
the state's water supply. Moreover, he asserted the savings in time
and travel costs were marginal at best, providing letters from leading shippers who claimed they would not even use the waterway for
"risk of collision and grounding that would be taken in navigating
the
Signs of declining support manifested on the other
side of the Capitol as a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations reviewed the issue as well. While not abandoning
it entirely, House officials suspended canal appropriations, along
with funding for four other New Deal water projects, until they had
run the routine course of procedure for rivers and harbors project~.~'
For months the fate of the canal was buffeted about as both
houses of Congress debated a series of appropriations bills in the
spring and summer of 1936. Canal boosters placed their faith
63. Arthur Vandenberg to Frank B. Shutts, 17 March 1936, Box 2, Vandenberg
Papers.
64. Arthur Vandenberg to Sidney Story, 26 February 1936, Box 2, Vandenberg
Papers.
65. Senate Resolution 210, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., Authorizing the Committee on
Commerce to Investigate Certain Matters Relative to the Florida Ship Canal
and the Establishment of Other Waterways, 6 Janua~y1936, in Buckrnan, ed.,
Documentary History, 163.
66. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, United
States Senate (74th Cong., 2nd sess.), on Senate Resolution 210, in Buckman,
ed., Documentary History, 193-97.
67. Barber, "Historyof the Florida Cross-State Canal," 187439.
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behind Duncan Fletcher in what soon became a legislative showdown over a $20 million appropriations bill, $12 million of which
would go to the Ship Canal. On the floor of the Senate,
Vandenberg traced the long lineage of the canal and its problems
and warned that the issue was "not just a little innocent amendment involving $20,000,000 . . . that is just the admission fee" for
what would eventually cost taxpayers as much as $200 million.68
Pleading for support, Fletcher countered Vandenberg's charges
with oratory, asking if the Senate would dare oppose "a mighty
stride of progress, the greatest undertaking in this generation on
the part of this Government. Is it possible that Senators will block
the way of the greatest accomplishment achieved by the
Government in this century?"69
In March 1936, the answer was clearly "yes" as the Senate voted
down Fletcher's amendment in a narrow vote of thirty-six to thirtyfive. The issue did not die, however, as Fletcher and other canal
supporters relied upon a variety of parliamentary procedures to
attach additional funding to a series of other legislative measures.'* Vandenberg fought back, working closely with anti-canal
forces in Florida to gather petitions and resolutions against the
project. The Senator suggested that telegrams and letters of
protest from "every Chamber of Commerce and every Luncheon
Club and every available political organization and every Woman's
C l u b would make for some fine ammunition in the
Regardless, procanal forces remained so persistent that, in the
words of Frank Kay Anderson, President of the Central and South
Florida Water Conservation Committee, the patience of agricultural interests "is wearing thin" after months of "trying to block the
attempt to crowd the canal upon Florida regardless of the consequences." Anderson threatened that unless the issue was quickly
resolved, he would call a demonstration of "approximately 60,000
men, women, and children" at the canal's construction site within
68. War Department Appropriation Bill for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30,
1937,"74th Cong., 2nd sess., H.R 11035, Amendment Proposed in the Senate
by Senator Fletcher, Congressional Record, 16 March 1936, in Buckman, ed.,
Documantay Histmy, 312.
69. Congressional Recmd, March 17, 1936, in Buckman, ed., Documentary Histmy,
338.
70. Blake, Land into Water-Water into Land 159-62; Barber, "History of the
Florida Cross-State Canal," 189-200.
71. Arthur Vandenberg to Edwin P. Thomas, 16 May 1936, Box 2, Vandenberg
Papers.
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forty-eight hours of "due notice from metropolitan newspapers,
news agencies, and newsreels. There would be no arms and no violence, only friendliness and jocularity; but digging operations can
be forced into suspension until troops are called out.""
As the debate dragged on, Roosevelt sat on the sidelines.
Facing an upcoming reelection, he sought to minimize his risks
and avoid alienating more voters by letting the controversy run its
course. At a news conference on April 15, he announced that he
would not forward any relief funds until Congress resolved the
issue. At the same time, Roosevelt offered canal supporters a thin
reed of hope by vaguely suggesting that he would consider modiIn the June session,
fied plans to further finance constru~tion.~~
however, the House rejected another Senate appropriation, ironically on the same day Duncan Fletcher died of a heart attack74
Without further funding, canal work halted in June of 1936.
As workers went home, Ocala's boom ended. Only 3 percent of
the project was complete, with only one-third of the estimated land
clearing finished. For all the money and time expended in canal
construction, the only visible reminders were four thousand acres
of land cleared along the right-of-way, almost thirteen million
cubic yards of excavated soil, and four concrete stanchions marking an incomplete highway bridge over a phantom waterway. As
for the 9'7 buildings on the 215 acres of Camp Roosevelt, they
became a school for another WPA program, the National Youth
~dministration.~~
The defeat of 1936 did not halt the call for a canal, for the project's boosters continued to advocate their case throughout the
federal bureaucracy for years to come. Indeed, just as opponents
thought they were finally burying the canal, the Army Corps of
Engineers, through the establishment of another special advisory
board, initiated one of many other reevaluations of the project.
Much like the nineteenth century, when one canal route survey
continually followed another, the review of economic projections
and construction costs-as well as further consideration of the
72. Frank Kay Anderson to Marvin H. McIntyre, 24 May 1936, Box 635, folder
"Florida Ship Canal-1936," Roosevelt Papers.
73. New Yurk Times,16 April 1936'1; "Dam Ditched; Ditch Damned," Time 27 (27
April 1936), 10.
74. Barber, "Histotyof the Florida Cross-State Canal," 199.
75. Congress, House, Atlantic-Guyship Canal, 9; Blake, Land into Water-Water into
Land, 161-62.
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groundwater issue-went through several iterations between the
interests of the Corps and the influence of Florida politicians
involved in Congressional Rivers and Harbors subcommittees.
While the costs, and even the depths, of the canal seemed to shift
with each report, engineers concluded as early as 1937 that,
though they supported the project, the supposed benefits of the
Ship Canal would eventually decrease as the size and speed of ships
continued to expand. Moreover, few imagined commerce would
sufficiently increase to justifY the expense of further construet i ~ n . ~ ~
Such hedging, even with the dire conclusions regarding the
efficacy of the project, did not deter pro-canal forces at either the
state or national levels. Under the sheer weight of bureaucratic
inertia, the Corps's own Chief of Engineers, for example, rejected
the board's 1937 report and automatically called for further construction in the name of work relief and navigation improvement.77 While the effort achieved no immediate signs of success,
it kept the idea of the project alive. And by reopening the canal
question, the Corps once again gave hope to boosters, which in
turn guaranteed further discord that increasingly stiffened the
determination of both sides of the canal issue. Over time such
intransigence established a pattern of debate that would continue
for nearly three generations as the initial groundbreaking of the
Atlantic Gulf Ship Canal took on a life of its own to become the
even more controversial Cross-Florida Barge Canal.

76. Barber, "Historyof the Florida Cross-State Canal,"199-205.
77. Ibid., 205.
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